Showing posts with label copper metal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label copper metal. Show all posts

Sunday, November 04, 2007

Currency Contrast of Commodity Prices

I am Canadian and as such when I look at commodity prices I convert to Canadian dollars. Earlier in the year the conversion meant adding as much as 19% onto the US quoted price yet today it means take 7% off.

The change in currency valuation is enormous for the base metal industry. If you look at the mining industry from a world perspective, there are some mines in the US, and for those mines wages have effectively declined as the US dollar has lost value in comparison to other currencies. The US has gone from a high of 1.1875 on Feb. 7 of this year to a low of 0.9323 this past week. At its height earlier in the year the US dollar was “worth” 27% more relative to the Canadian dollar. A $30/hour US wage on Feb 7th was $35.62 Canadian and at the low, this week, it is $27.97 Canadian. Canadian wages have done the opposite. A $30/hour Canadian wage at the height of the US dollar was $25.26 US and now it is $32.18 US.

For US based mining companies wages are fairly fixed relative to the US quoted commodity price. Their might be union contracts that give them an increase, but when you do your back of the napkin calculation on a company using commodity prices you do not need to correct for costs due to currency changes for mines located in the US. That cannot be said for mines located in the rest of the world.

Given that the US dollar has lost ground with almost all other currencies, when the “costs” are converted to US dollars the increases will be staggering, as the wage conversion calculation above shows. I suspect many investors are not going to be prepared for what this does to the value of their investments. The full effect of these increased costs are not going to show up in the third quarter financial reports, although some will. For the third quarter the US dollar averaged around 1.05. As of this week it has declined a further 12%. Only a portion of those wage changes will show up in the next series of quarterly reports. Expect to see costs up in that 12% range for 4th quarter results being reported next January to March.

The margins, or earnings, on base metal stocks are affected by both the costs, which are in the currency of the country and the commodity prices, which are quoted in US dollars. The workers may not have gotten wages, but once the costs are converted to US dollars, they are simply up dramatically relative to the US dollar in most countries. This is not good for investors, especially investors in commodity stocks with high P/Es. In general, I suspect that chances are if a base metal stock has a P/E over about 6-12 right now, depending on other strengths/weakness of the company, it is going to correct downwards in the next year, indeed, if the LME warehouse stock levels continue to rise this estimate may be conservative because of metal price declines due to increasing supply.

The one year copper spot price shows three almost equal peaks in the spot price of about $3.70 US, in April, July and October. In Canadian dollars those “peaks” are about $4.25, $3.85 and $3.60. Today in Canadian the US price of $3.40 is about $3.16 Canadian. In Canadian dollars the price of copper was about 35% higher at its peak. In an earlier blog I looked at the Bingham Canyon mine. About 2/3rds of the revenue when straight to earnings for the period I looked at it. Because this mine is located in the US it is not going to see enormous wage increases, although it will probably see large energy costs increasing. However, this mine will still have exceptionally healthy earnings, although the margin may decline a little. This mine has lots of room that if it saw a 35% hair cut on revenues it is still highly profitable, with probably 40-50% of revenue making it to earnings. Contrast that to a mine with say 20% of revenue with strong prices going to earnings. At 35% hair cut in commodity prices means that the mine is now losing money.

I dislike nickel immensely, and here’s why. Nickel prices peaked in April at around $24/lb US. In Canadian that would be around $27.50, and there is a lot of nickel being mined in Canada. On Friday nickel closed at $14.35 US, which is now about $13.40 Canadian. Nickel peaked at a price over 100% higher. The good thing about nickel is the peak was a short-term spike and that utterly unsustainable price only got averaged into earnings for a very short period. The very, very bad thing about nickel is that a number of nickel stocks have priced in an earnings expectation based on a much higher nickel price than is realistic. The current price is already a strong nickel price and a wise investor would be evaluating their investment at $10-12/lb nickel. I believe to have priced a nickel stock with a high P/E with the outrageous nickel price of $21.65/lb, or $25 Canadian, as investors in FNX mining did in the first quarter will prove to be economic suicide.

In my May 30th post on FNX I pointed out many problems with investing in this company, and in the shorter term the price has gone higher than the roughly $35/share it was at then. But, short-term hype and speculation is not true valuation and this is the type of investment susceptible a wake-up-one-morning to 40-50% haircut. Going back to first quarter, earnings were $30 million (extrapolate to $120 million full year expectation) with an average price of $21.65 and an exchange rate of 1.17. Guidance was that earnings are supposed to decline by $9 million per $1 decline in nickel price, so expect $66 million decline from the contraction of nickel price. A 10% change in exchange will kill another $12.7 million in earnings, so expect another $32 million decline from exchange, or $98 million. That leaves about $22 million for full year earnings, or $5.5 million per quarter. Factoring in the roughly 70% increase in production expected, that would give about $9 million per quarter, or earnings of $36 million per year. Assuming share count has not increase, which is full year earnings of about $0.42/share, outrageously low for a $37 commodity stock. The earnings have gone 36c the first quarter, 40c the second quarter and 15c this past quarter, yet this quarter had record output. Earnings were 24c/share in Q3 the year before. Output increased by 50%, yet instead of a 50% increase in earnings to 36c, earning were 15c, an expectation decline of 58%. The average exchange rate was 1.04 for quarter 3. Now it is 0.93. That 15c/quarter extrapolated to a full year is 60c, but factor in that further currency decline and expect to see next quarter earnings of 10-12c.

Anyone doing a peer valuation of their nickel stock relative to FNX is seriously misleading himself or herself.
I expected the US dollar to decline relative to the Canadian dollar, but never in my wildest dreams would I have predicted 0.9323 this fast. I suspect there is not an analyst report out there that has factored in the drastic loss of revenues, or alternative drastic cost increases, due to the strong changes in valuation of the US dollar.

I don’t have time to look at the degree of change in other commodity prices right now, but my prediction is 100% US companies will perform better relative to companies with operations in other countries because they will only be dealing with how commodity prices affect their bottom line where as other companies will have the huge challenges of how the drastic decline in the US dollar affects either costs or revenues, depending on what currency they do their reporting in.

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Sunday, September 30, 2007

The Abundance of Minerals

In “Earth for Sale” I did a very rough calculation to determine the values of metals in the Earth’s crust for copper and uranium. The point of the post was that there are such enormous amounts of minerals in the ground, giving value to that which is in the ground at strong prices is imprudent, as that was the only “fundamental” behind the vertical ascent of uranium stocks.

This post will look closer at relative abundance of metals and how they are currently valued. I used the abundance values from Jefferson Lab and calculated the percent of the Earth’s crust each mineral would make up. I then calculated the volume of 1 km of the Earth’s crust taking the difference in volume of the Earth and a sphere 1km smaller. I used a density of 2.7g/cm^3 and 30% land area. For each metal I multiplied by the percent abundance and divided by either 454g for pounds or 31.1g for troy ounces and multiplied by the metal price.

Mineral Abundance % of Crust Spot Price
09/26/07
"Value"
Aluminum 82300 ppm 8.2% $1.09/lb $8*10^19
Copper 60 ppm 0.006% $3.64/lb $2*10^17
Gold 4 ppb 0.0000004% $728/oz $4*10^16
Lead 14 ppm 0.0014% $1.60/lb $2*10^16
Molybdenum 1.2 ppm 0.00012% $32.25 /lb $3.5*10^16
Nickel 84 ppm 0.0084% $14.61 /lb $1*10^18
Palladium 15 ppb 0.0000015% $342/oz $7*10^16
Platinum5 ppb0.0000005%$1349/oz$9*10^16
Rhodium1 ppb0.0000001%$6225/oz$8*10^16
Silver75 ppb0.0000075%$12.53/oz$1.3*10^16
Zinc70 ppm0.007%$1.36/lb$9*10^16
Iridium1 ppb0.0000001%$450/oz$6*10^15
Uranium2.7 ppm0.00027%$85/lb$2*10^17



The “value” of metals in the Earth’s crust is grossly out of line with reality. The “value” of aluminum in the 1st km of the Earth’s crust is “worth” 80 quintillions (80 million trillions) – about 200,000 times the $415 trillion in derivative contracts that existed at the end of 2006. The lesson here is you are going to get in trouble with investments if you value metal equities based on what is in the ground. Not all minerals in the ground can be mined, but if you assumed only 1% of each mineral, or even 1/10th of 1% is recoverable, the numbers are still enormous. The metals of your commodity investment are only worth those prices if they make it to market and get sold at those prices.

Each mineral on the list is subject to supply and demand based on the mineral. Take a look going back 15 years at the price of Aluminum, which is the metal with the highest “value” in the Earth’s crust, and you see that the current price is about double the 15 year low.

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Aluminum has not done the same degree of outrageous price increases and spikes as other metals. I would suggest the reason is that there is so much aluminum, the market can respond far faster to under and over supply situations. At 8.2% of the earth’s crust, aluminum is a macro element. The price of aluminum temporarily spiked to about 3 times the 15-year-low. It is currently about double the price of 15 years ago. The current price is still on the strong side in comparison to historical prices, but if you think about it from just an inflation perspective, many things have doubled in the past 15 years.

Iridium, which is the least followed and known metal on the list, also has the smallest relative valuation. It has limited applications. It is the most corrosive resistant metal known. It is also tied with Rhodium in terms of how rare it is on Earth, yet Rhodium has about 14 times the price, and relative valuation in the Earth’s crust. The following graph shows that Rhodium was not always so dearly valued; it is up about 16x what it was just a few years ago.

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One has to ask if new applications and demand for rhodium really justify the increase. Rhodium tends to be mined with platinum group metals. Has world demand for rhodium increased that significantly relative to platinum? How sustainable is the demand at that price? I don’t know the answers, but I would be researching them if my investments were dependent on Rhodium price.

Nickel, uranium and copper are the next strongest valued metals. Nickel and uranium have had tremendous hype, hysteria, and speculation, very much like the tech boom of the late 90s. There is absolutely no shortage of these elements in the Earth’s crust, none what-so-ever.

Uranium consumption is about 150 million pounds per year. Say it increases 7-fold, to 1 billion pounds per year, and only 1/10th of 1% could be mined, well, that would mean the Earth has about a 2 thousand year supply. A price boom on uranium in the 70s resulted in about 50 years of uranium reserves being found. The current market is under 100,000 tons per year, which is very small compared to other metals. At the current rate that uranium is being used, current world resources would last 70 years. (http://www.uic.com.au/nip75.htm)

The shortage of uranium has nothing to do with its availability to in the ground, but rather the special licensing and controls that uranium mining is subject to do due to its inherently dangerous nature. Building uranium mines takes an extra 2-5 years longer than other mines because of the extra controls and safety concerns. Uranium spiked to about 13x its lows and as little as 2-3 years ago mining companies were bidding to supply uranium in the $10-15/lb range. Those who cash in on uranium will be those who enter long-term uranium contacts at higher prices, and those who are already in the process of building mines. The price of uranium will probably remain stronger for longer not because uranium deposits are unknown, but because the mines are not built and they take longer to build. When you consider the price was $10-15 just two to three years ago, even $40-50/lb is a very strong price.

Nickel is 1.4 times more abundant than copper and 30 times more abundant than Uranium in the Earth’s crust. The 15-year price chart for nickel shows it had a price around $3/lb, for years.

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BHP’s financial results shows they made a good profit on nickel in 2006 at price around $7/lb and they more than tripled their earnings from nickel with nickel averaging around $20/lb. Nickel price is up because there was a supply squeeze, and it is unlikely that the price drop is finished when companies were able to make good profits at $7/lb. Nickel is highly abundant, and world demand is relatively small, about 1.5 million tonnes per year. Apparently some nickel supply is now coming from ore being imported into China and producing nickel at $8/lb. This new source of supply appears to be increasing rapidly.

Copper has a high value, but it has a much higher demand, about 16-18 million tonnes per year. This is about 10-12 times the demand of nickel. Relatively speaking, nickel has about 15x the abundance when contrasted to the relative size of world demand. Nickel completely lacks scarcity yet the price spiked to 8x that 10-year average price from about 93 to 03.

Copper price has spiked, but not as much as nickel in relative terms.

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Clearly there is a price dip from 1998 to 2003. It is a time when companies were choosing to sell off valuable holding because of carrying costs and many new companies have made a fortune off what were previously cast-offs, some strictly on speculation, but quite a few by building mines. Copper price spiked to about 6x the weakest price in its history. Copper had a much stronger downward price trend that the other metals. Copper prices are strong and susceptible to downward price corrects. There are many strong “bears” about the copper market and there will be a downward price correction at some point, there always is, but the relative abundance to nickel and uranium when the size of the world market is considered makes me think that nickel and uranium are susceptible to stronger price corrections, but the uranium price corrections will lag due to the differences in building mines.

What has bigger implications for the price of copper is how many deposits like the recently discovered Noront drill results. Drill results on a press release today identify 68 meters averaging 5.9% nickel, 3.1% copper, 2.87 g/t platinum, 9.78 g/t palladium, 0.61 g/t gold and 8.5 g/t silver. In prior posts I talk about declining grade and how it is increasing costs so prices have a much higher cost support. I do not know how big this deposit will be, but if it were big, it would be profitable at very, very low copper prices. It does make me wonder if the declining grade being mined that seems apparent in report after report that I read is because mining efforts have focused on what resources that were known and real new exploration that would find high quality grades has been limited. This discovery should make investors in low quality grades very uncomfortable.

The value of gold surprised me. For something “scarce” the metal values in the ground are awfully high, $40 quadrillion dollars, or forty thousand trillions. Are there not these big market fears around the over $400 trillion in derivatives and somehow gold is supposed to prevent this by limiting the money supply? I pulled up a web page (http://www.gold.org/value/stats/statistics/gold_demand/index.html) that states that global demand for gold reached a record $14.5 billion last quarter. That’s about 1/300 millionth of the value of the metal in the ground. If 1/10th of one percent is recoverable, then that is $40 trillion available, or the supply can be expanded about 10-fold. At the current rate of mining the out of the ground gold supply is increasing by about 1.6% per year. Current the rate of mining seems small compared to the amount of gold that can potentially be mined. Infomine shows 1880 companies in their database involved with gold. I would think that strong gold prices would increase the mining and exploration activity of these companies and eventually increase output.

In order for price to go up you need to have more people/corporations wanting to hold gold as an investment. Currently more people seem to want to own the gold stocks as opposed to the bullion and the gold stock bugs seem utterly confused that the price of gold does not go up as they expect. It seems to me that until such time as there is a shift and the so called believers in gold actually own gold and/or the gold companies stop selling their gold there will be continued restraint on gold prices. Truly, the theory that banks are weak because they lack a gold standard because they’ve sold their gold equally applies to gold stocks as they sell off their hard assets for fiat currency.

Looking further, I find that at the end of 2005 there was around 155,000 tonnes of gold being stored in either jewelery or bars, or roughly $3.6 trillion dollars worth of gold, and they mining about $60 billion worth of gold each year. The value of gold per person from that 155,000 ton stockpile is about $500 and keeping prices constant, it is increasing by about $10/year per person from new mining. Certainly if people lose faith in paper money there is not a lot of already mined gold to go around, but there are many other hard assets that people can chose as investments that can also protect wealth. Gold does not appear to have the same degree of asset price inflation as other investments. Certainly if your country’s currency is declining, or at risk of declining relative to other currencies gold is probably a good currency hedge.

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The above graph shows that if you are American and bought gold six months ago the US dollar value of your investment is up over 10%. However, if you are Canadian, the value of your investment relative to the Canadian dollar is down 4.5%.

As investors I think it is a good idea to be aware of how much actual metals exist and to use this kind of knowledge in assessing real value as opposed to apparent value in the assumption that metals in the ground today will be worth the same forever or even be stronger forever.

Looking at this makes me wonder more about iridium. It seems that the most corrosive resistant element would have market growth potential and it does not seem to have the same speculative pricing built into it.

In any event, I did quite a bit of traveling in the summer and now I am in the process of moving so I have not had the same kind of time to look at investments. So, I am still around, but not as able to be actively posting. I will probably work on shorter and less time consuming posts in the future.

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Saturday, September 15, 2007

1000% in 15 trading days - It happens

Could have, would have, should have...

I could not help but notice, after the fact, that a stock that has been on my watch list since last December quite possibly made some kind of stock market record here.

Between August 20th and August 27th one could have bought Noront Resources for under 40c/share on the Canadian venture exchange. On September 13th it reached a high of $4.05 and closed at $3.94. About 80 million shares were traded during the 1st 4 days of the week -- they have about 90 million shares and another 33 million warrants and stock options. So, very close to the entire float being traded.

September 14th it was halted, and it remains halted. Rumor is that there will be news on Monday and trading will resume on Tuesday.

You can check them out at http://www.norontresources.com/home.htm

Personally, I wouldn't touch it at this point, but it is going to be interesting to watch.

The news that got so much attention... drill results of 36 meters averaging 1.84% nickel and 1.53% copper, and not that deep, starting at 56 meters down. Certainly, if this proves to be a large deposit it would be very profitable, but it would take 5-10 years to actually build a mine, so there has been way too much speculation here.

But it will be interesting to watch.

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Sunday, July 29, 2007

Copper $1.50 Next Year?

Some things you read stop you mid-step and send you re-evaluating what makes sense to you. Early I posted that I believe the average price on commodities would be higher than they have been.

The evidence shows that companies were cannibalizing their assets to reduce costs when commodities reached their all time low in 2002 and set up a squeeze on supply that has caused on average about a 6-fold increase from the 2002 lows, which if the lows were reasonable, would be utterly unsustainable pricing, but the lows were as insane as some of the highs have been, like $50k/ton nickel.

Frank Veneroso has been promoting that investors are at enormous risk due to the excessively high price of commodities and he uses that benchmark low in 2002 to say copper increased to peak of 570% of its low, which is true and by using these numbers he calculates numbers and projects scenarios that would wipe out commodity investors. His report can be found on his web site, venerosoassociates.net.

Sprott Asset Management has been promoting that because of China and emerging markets commodities are in a super cycle like one that has never been seen before, and their material is worth reviewing, sprott.com/pdf/marketsataglance/04-2007.pdf.

Investors that listened to Mr Veneroso over the past couple years have missed tremendous gains in the commodity market, and certainly from my analysis I believe some of those gains are unsustainable, but an all out implosion of the sector as a whole?

Independent information, for example, DryShips, a shipping company shows historical graphs of what has been shipped to China.

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This graph is for ore, but this kind of data is abundant on the Internet for shipping of commodities if you look at shipping companies. Indeed, shipping companies have done very well because of this utterly enormous increase in imports from China. By all accounts, China has been a sinkhole for commodities.

If I hand pick the low, as Mr Veneroso has, and contrast it to the high in terms of shipping, 7.4 m tons from December 02 to 29.5 m tons in Feb 06 is a 4-fold increase in ore imports, but that is over stating the growth of imports as is Mr Veneroso’s claim of 570% for copper. Overall, China’s demand for commodities has grown and the growth or ore is about 2.5 times what it was about 5 years ago.

Steven Saville maintains that the global boom in commodity prices is driven by inflation, not real growth, and his post, stockhouse.com/shfn/editorial.asp?edtID=19969, is worth reading. What particularly got my attention was the graph of SS CPI Adjusted Copper Price.

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A strong criticism of the Veneroso report is that he uses government inflation data, data that if anyone compares to their true costs knows is a blatant lie. I have calculated that the inflation that I have experienced in my non-discretionary costs is more like 5-6% over my adult life, and something I recently read pointed out that US government data specifically excludes housing, food and energy. Veneroso’s report would be more useful in assessing where commodities actually stand if it took into consideration realistic inflation rates because there are some truths to some of the things he says.

If anything, Saville’s graph shows a downward price trend with high levels of volatility and possibly the beginning of an upward trend.

So, what is the “truth”?

Investors need to come with their own "truth" that makes sense to them based on the evidence presented to them. What seems plausible to me may not seem plausible to others. Only time will tell which “truth” was correct.

For me to come up with what seems plausible I look at a bigger picture, and I go back a hundred years and try to relate what I am seeing to what I believe to be true.

So, a hundred years ago the concept of open pit mines was utterly new and a grade of 2% copper, stellar by today’s standards, was considered low grade. Mining was predominately underground and equipment obviously antiquated. Adjusting for inflation the price of copper was actually around today’s price, and if you further adjusted it for the manipulation to understate inflation, the price of copper was actually grossly higher than today. The graph above does show that copper had been declining in price and I would suggest that to go back further you would find a much longer term decline in the price of copper.

So, technology improved and the leverage of work output improvements to each worker declined as machines continued to get bigger and better. It is analogous to computer technology. In the 90s each computer upgrade was 100s and perhaps 1000s of times better, but lately upgrades are well under 100% better.

For mining, it would not surprise me if the efficiency of workers has improved because of these bigger machines so that one person in the actual mine does in the range of 100 times the productivity of 100 years ago. A lesson from my schooling is that real wealth is created by this kind of efficiency of leveraging worker output and it enabled wages to increase, prices to decline and I suspect, at least for copper, that it hid an overall declining grade of copper being mined over the last 100 years.

The Bingham Canyon mine started mining a 2% grade and the grade they now mine is less than 1/3rd of that. Some minerals are far more abundant, like aluminium, so over all grade declines would not be as significant, and for me, that is the most plausible reason aluminium has not seen the same degree of ramp up on price. It is my guess based on what I know about the world.

Today’s machines have reached limits of technology. You can’t build a 30-story wood frame building because the tensile strength of the wood will not allow it, as are the limits of today’s machines. There may yet be technological improvements, but they will be much slower coming and they will never give the kind of leveraged improvements of the past.

Living in BC, my truth points to a very strong other source of leverage of earnings for mining companies as the gains in technology declined – the export of jobs to countries employing slave labour wages. In BC in the 80s mines closed and were no longer economically sustainable. The move of the mining industry to countries with lower wages allowed the continued overall decline in commodity prices. Mines with good grades in North America were sustainable, but this trend wiped out lower grade mines.

The move of highly leverage productivity jobs to other countries empowered workers and workers have demanded and gone on strike for better wages and working conditions in these other countries, so the wage gap has declined and the options to export jobs to lower paying countries has dried up.

So, basically not a single economy of scale to reduce prices exists anymore, not increased leverage of output due to technology, not export of jobs to cheaper countries and to top it off, declining grade of mined ores can not longer hide behind these effects. I believe many analysts are missing the decline of grade in their analysis when they come up with something like $1- to $1.50 copper as a long-term price.

And then there is yet another point to take note of, the over burdening level of US debt and spending that is killing the US currency. Commodity prices are quoted in US dollars and there has been an enormous decline in the US dollar with respect to other countries, for example, Canada, Australia, Russia, Chile, and China.

Canada vs US
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Australia vs US
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Russia vs US
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Chili vs US
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China vs US (2 yr)
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The US dollar has not declined with respect to all countries, but in terms of the world market, the US commodity price quote has not increased to the same degree if the prices were quoted in other currencies.

So as I see it, there are four driving forces for increased commodity prices:


  • Inflation

  • Wage demands in excess of inflation

  • Declining grade which leads to increased costs

  • A declining US currency

Considering these factors, I simply cannot see a long-term copper price being less than about $2, and costs for producing commodities will exceed the rate of inflation overall. Indeed, a real risk to investors is declining margins due to increasing costs.

However, an estimate of a long-term price isn’t a statement of belief that prices will never go below the price. Clearly, in 2002 prices were below a long-term sustainable price, as they are currently most likely above a long-term sustainable price.

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Saturday, June 30, 2007

Yamana, Northern Orion, and Meridian Gold Merger

Northern Orion first got my attention last fall when it was trading at about $4 Canadian at the beginning of October 2006, and given its under valuation, the upward march in October made sense. Then it gradually declined, again touching just under the $4 mark at the beginning of January.

It was during that descent that I started to contrast how it was being valued relatively in the market to ensure my perspective was reasonable and because of the joint ownership of the Alumbrera mine, Goldcorp was the most logical company to contrast relative valuations. The result was How I discovered the Gold Bubble and I came to the conclusion that Northern OrionLoading... was a buy to $7 based on its property holdings.

Wednesday’s joint news release announces a proposal to merger between Yamana Gold, and Northern OrionLoading... with an offer for Meridian Gold to be a part of the deal. The effective price for Northern OrionLoading... is $7.07 per share, a 21.3% premium over the day’s closing price, the same valuation that I came up with for Northern OrionLoading... without development of the Auga Rica property.

Northern Orion also has two types of warrants. The regular warrant holders closed at $4/share on Wednesday, so with an exercise price of $2, they have a 27% premium on the close, and still have until May 29, 2008 to exercise their warrants. The A warrants were not “in the money” warrants. They are exercisable until February 17, 2010. If Northern Orion managed to get their Auga Rica property developed in time for the A warrants, the roughly 600% growth in production meant that those out of the money warrants had a potentially very nice risk-reward ratio. The A warrants transfer to buy 0.543 of a Yamana share for $6. It means that Yamana’s share value must increase to $14.42, or $1.40 over the $13.02 close, in order for the A warrants to be in the money at their $1.83 price. Without this offer Northern Orion’s share price would have to increase $2 to $7.83 for the A warrants to be in the money. Relatively speaking, before the deal Northern Orion’s shares had to increase 34% to break even and at the time of the press release Yamana’s shares have to increase by 11% to break even.

But, that was before today’s Yamana’s share price declined. With the decline to $11.83 the take-over price works out to $6.42 for Northern Orion, and for the A warrants the Yamana share price needs to increase 23% to $14.54 to be in the money from today’s $1.90 close.

Before any merger fully diluted Yamana Gold has 381.9 million shares. The merge adds 309.4 million shares for shares and if all Northern Orion warrants and options were exercised, another 37.5 million. A real plus for Meridan Gold is they state they’ve only had 36% stock dilution compared to an average of 417% among their peers since 2000. There appears to be only an extra 820,830 options, so very little dilution. If all options were exercised there would be an additional 1.8 million shares, for a total of 730.6 million shares. Going with Wednesday’s close of $13.02, that would give a fully diluted market cap of $9.5 billion, which has declined to $8.6 billion with today’s price decline.

Production

So, putting together the total of the three company’s production, and you have:

Northern Orion

  • Alumbrera, Argentina, about 50 million pounds of copper, 75,000 oz gold
Northern Orion can expect about $160 million of gross revenue, Q1 gross sales were $34.8 million. The royalty that kicked last year is costing 96c/lb of copper for Q1.

Meridian Gold
  • Rossi/Storm JV, Nevada, 25,000 oz gold for 2007, 30-40,000 oz for 2008
  • El Penon, Chili, 230,000 oz gold, 6 million oz silver
  • Minera Florida, Chili, 70,000 oz gold
  • Zinc production, 8 million pounds, my estimate from Q1 financial report
Meridian Gold can expect about $300 million gross revenue, Q1 gross sales were $66.4 million.
Yamana
  • 600,000 oz gold, 140 million pounds of copper.
Yamana can expect about $840 million gross revenue, Q1’s gross were $145.1 million.
Combined production is about 1 million ounces gold, 6 million ounces silver, 8 million pounds zinc and 190 million pounds of copper. At $650/oz for gold, $12.50/oz for silver, $1.50/lb for zinc and $3.20/lb for copper it gives about $1.3 billion in gross sales without hedges.
Q1 earnings were $27.4 million for Yamana, $9.5 million for Northern Orion, and $18.9 million for Meridian Gold, or $55.8 million.
Quality of Reserves
Grade quality of reserves and resources must also be considered.
Yamana
At December 2006 Yamana had 6.9 million ounces of gold at 0.49 g/ton, or metal values of $10/ton. Additionally there is 2.3 billion pounds of copper at 0.35% or about $25/ton. As some of the copper metal values overlap with the gold, weighted average metal values of copper and gold combined work out to $28/ton. The 13.7 million ounce of gold and 2.8 billion pounds of copper in the mineral resource has smaller average metal values, about $23/ton.
If you could master 100% recovery, at these grades you need to mine over 63 tonnes of ore to produce a single ounce of gold with 0.49 g/ton. Chances are they have higher grade veins to mine first, but the sheer magnitude of the amount of ore per ounce of gold suggests high production costs, or grossly increasing production costs as the grade mined declines.
To put it into perspective, the Chapada property has both the copper and gold and its metal values work out to $37/ton in the proven reserves and $30/ton in the probable reserves, essentially a 20% decline in metal values as the mine life proceeds and they move from mining the proven reserves to the probable reserves. At 0.34 g/ton 92 tonnes of ore must be mined for an ounce of gold. Take the grade down to the 0.26 g/ton and you need 120 tonnes of ore. Compounding this problem is that recovery rates also tend to decline as the grade declines, so where you might have had 90% recovery, you now have 80 or 85% recovery, the 92 tonnes required becomes 102 tonnes required at 90% recovery and the 120 tonnes required becomes 142 tonnes at 85% recovery.
You can take copper production and take those dollars and apply them to gold production and give the appearance of low cost gold production, but what you’ve essentially done is allow copper production to trade at gold multiples. With Q1/07 dilute earnings of 7c/share multiplied forward by 4 quarters you get 28c/share. That gives a P/E of 46, so copper sales are trading at a P/E multiple of 46.
Looking further, for Q1 the Chapada mine produced 38,954 oz gold and 27.5 million pounds of copper. That is about 32% of the gold production. Chapada was responsible for 60.6% of the net revenue, which leveraged to 87.4% of the operating earnings. That detail screams that the other mines are not making much money. For Q1 the grade mined at Chapada was 0.57 g/ton gold and 0.47% copper, the metal values per tonne mined were $45/ton, way more than the $37/ton metal values for the remainder of the proven reserves, and the $30/ton of the probable reserves.
Northern Orion
Alumbrera has a life of mine until 2016 and has 0.45% copper, 0.014% molybdenum and 0.47g/ton of gold for metal values of about $51/ton. Alumbrera has a 20% royalty that kicked in last year.
Agua Rica has reserves of 0.50% copper, 0.033% molybdenum and 0.23g/ton gold for metal values of about $61/ton. The Agua reserve has 8 billion pounds contained copper, 531 million pounds molybdenum and 5.4 million ounces of gold.
Meridian Gold
Meridian’s El Penon is stellar, 6.6 g/ton of gold and 275 g/ton of silver in the proven and probable reserves. At $640/oz for gold and $12/oz for silver, that’s a very nice $242/ton in metal values.
Minera Florida has 1.5% zinc, 27 g/ton silver and 5.3 g/ton gold for $169/ton metal values.
Rossi has a resource grade of 15.4 g/ton of gold for $317/ton, but the deposit is very small.
Esquel is has a stellar grade of 23g/ton of silver and 15g/ton of gold for $317/ton.
Of the three, Meridian Gold has the smallest reserve/resource contribution, but it has more profitable grades, even for the more costly underground mining.
The Growth Profile
Checking out their presentation, the two-year plan is to move from 1 million ounces of production this year to 1.5 million ounce by 2009, or a 50% increase in gold production. Say gold is $650/oz, that’s an extra $325 million/year of gross revenue. A move from 1 million ounces to 1.5 million ounces would only increase the gross revenue by about 25% as about half the revenue is from the zinc, copper and silver. There may be plans to increase production of these metals, but that information was not included in their presentation.
The increased production plan does not include developing Agua Rica, or Esquel. Agua Rica has a feasibility study to produce 365 million pounds of copper, 125,000 oz of gold and 16 million pounds of molybdenum. Say copper was $2/lb and molybdenum was $15/lb and gold $700/oz, that would give $1 billion of gross revenue. There would be no outrageous 96c/lb royalty on this production. There could also be the option of partnering with Alumbrera for some other kind of production arrangements as they are close together.
Conclusion
Just because you label a company a gold producer or a base metal producer is not justification to accept different valuations for producing an identical product, such as copper, silver and zinc and for Yamana the market is grossly overvaluing production from producing these metals in comparison to if they’d been produced by say, Quadra.
Also, the market tends to fail to adjust valuation for reserves based on the quality of the reserves. The low metal values per ton for Yamana suggest that the reserves should be valued at a significant discount when you consider that the mining costs per ton tend to be fairly fixed costs. When grades are $50/ton, $10 processing per ton is 20%. At $25/ton it is 40%.
The gold grades are low and the actual production costs without metals credits are high. When Chapada’s costs are fairly allocated between copper and gold you get 66c/lb production costs for copper and $187/oz for gold.
Yamana is sufficiently overvalued that the “premium” offered to Northern Orionand Meridian is completely fiat.
Do your own due diligence, these are strictly my opinions. For the record, I owned Northern Orion until I realized it could very well be taken over by some bubble-valued gold producer.

Read More......

Tuesday, June 19, 2007

Bingham Canyon Mine – The World’s Largest Copper Mine

Mining has a rich history and the Bingham Canyon mine has one of the richest histories. Operating since 1906, it is the world’s first open pit mining operation and it showed the world how to mine low-grade minerals profitably.



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In 1906 there was a 9000 ft mountain. The mine is now ¾ of a mile deep.




In the late 1800s a man named Daniel Jackling first got the idea that perhaps copper could be mined from the surface if the operation was big enough. Old time miners in the region thought he was crazy to even consider trying to mine such a low grade, which was a mere 2% or about 38 lbs/ton. Today that grade, about $120/ton at today’s prices, would be considered very good by open pit copper mining standards. The original goal was to mine 2000 tons per day, which a quick calculation suggests about a 25 million pound per year when operations started in 1906. It wasn’t long before the Bingham Canyon mine was the only mining operation in the region.

In 2006 the grade mined was 0.63% copper, 0.057% molybdenum, with 0.49 g/ton gold and 3.5 g/ton silver. At today’s prices that’s $90/ton metal values. In 2006 Bingham mined concentrates that contained about 580 million pounds of copper, 37 million pounds of molybdenum, 523,000 oz gold, and 4.2 million oz silver, about 17% US copper production. The smelter was shut for 63 days so only about 90% of the concentrate was refined.

Bingham Canyon mine claims to be the world’s biggest mine, as does Escondida in Chili. Who’s telling the truth? Escondida currently has the largest production in the world, about 2.8 billion pounds per year, 8.1% of the world’s copper production, and its production is more than 100 times Bingham 1906 initial production. Started in 1990 at 6-700 million pounds per year, Escondida has not produced the most copper in the world, that title belongs to Bingham Canyon.

To put into perspective how much mining has happened at Bingham Canyon over the last 100 years when Daniel Jackling first built his mine there was a 9000 ft high mountain and now there is a hole ¾ of a mile deep and 2.5 miles across the top, 500 miles of roads in the pit and it has produced over 17 billion pounds of copper.

Bingham Canyon mine uses some of the most equipment today. The shovel weighs 2.5 million pounds and pick up 98 tons with a single scoop. The trucks carry between 255 and 350 tons of rock.

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The trucks and shovel look small until you look at the tires.


The mine has been highly profitable and been described as “the richest hole on the Earth.” It is operated by Kenncott Utah Copper, which is owned by Rio Tinto. Of the $7.4 billion in profits that Rio Tinto had in 2006, about $1.8 billion came from Kenncott Utah Copper.

The life of the mine is currently projected until 2017 with reserves of 0.54% copper, 0.043% molybdenum, 0.32 g/ton gold and 2.59 g/ton silver, or about 18% less metal values per ton mined in 2006. The declining reserve grades does mean that profitability will decline and Bingham Canyon Mine’s centennial year (2006) may also go down as its most profitable year in its history. Future considerations after the open pit operations come to an end is to consider the economics of under ground mining for metal resource that can not be reached through open pit operations.

To evaluate if Bingham Canyon mine is a good investment, investors need to check out Rio Tinto. It trades in the ADR under the ticker RTP.

Rio Tinto has a market cap of $113 billion. Sales in 2006 were $25.4 billion and earnings were $7.338 billion, or about 6.5% of the market cap. Reinvestment for capital projects in 2006 was $3.9 billion, with $1.1 billion of that financed through increasing debt.

The copper group made 49% of the 2006 earnings, with Bingham and a 30% ownership of Escondida being the two largest contributors to the copper revenues. Escondida has a life-of-mine that should go 25-30 years. Depending on the grade an economic feasibility to switching to under ground mining, Bingham’s revenue stream may need to be replaced in the next decade and Rio Tinto has interests in 4 world-class undeveloped projects in the works to start in 4-10 years that will meet that objective:

  • 100% ownership of La Gradja in Peru.
  • 9.95% increasing to 19.9% interest in Oyu Tolgoi (Turquoise Hill), in Mongolia.
  • 19.8% interest in Pepple in Alaska.
  • 55% interest of Resolution Copper, 2 km deep.
Rio Tinto has a diverse holding of properties, diamonds, alumina, aluminum, coal, iron, uranium, and titanium in many countries in the world. Reports are in US currency. To quote from Rio Tinto’s 2007 outlook published in February:

Since January 2003 strong appreciation against the US dollar has been seen in the Brazilian Real (61%), Australian dollar (37%) and the Canadian dollar (32%). This in turn has increased mining production costs as denominated in US currency.

US currency has declined further since that report, further putting upward pressure on production costs as they are reported in US currency. This puts downward pressure on earnings.

Furthermore, commodity prices were very strong in 2006, and with strong prices there is more risk for price declines. With a company as big as Rio Tinto mines are constantly coming to the end of their mine life, so there is a constant need for replacement projects to maintain operations, never mind increasing operations. Rio Tinto’s $3.9 billion in capital projects demonstrates that they are focused on ensuring a strong production profile.

A problem for Rio Tinto that a small company does not have is that it is so big, any meaningful production growth can be offset by declines in price because relative meaningful increases in production relative to their size affects the supply to the point it can push prices down. For example increasing Rio Tinto’s copper production by 10%, say around 200 million pounds, and that would increase world supply by about 0.5%. A small company’s existing production might only be 100 million pounds, so that increase would triple their production, or increase by 200%. Rio Tinto’s relative increased production is so small, so it gives little protection from downward price risks compared to the small company. The downward prices risks would be enormous if Rio Tinto tried to double their production.

There is no question that Rio Tinto is an amazing company with exceptional management that pays attention to not diluting the share count, but with strong commodity prices investors have not properly considered what happens to their investment if commodity prices decline. It simply isn’t wise to price a big commodity company above a P/E of about 12.

Read More......

Wednesday, May 30, 2007

FNX Mining - Cashing in on Nickel

"FNX quadruples resource base" boasted the press release, and adding up the
measured, indicated and inferred resources gives 1,087 million pounds of
copper, 1,105 million pounds of nickel and 1,016,000 oz of precious metals.

In US prices at $23.23/lb for nickel, $3.34/lb for copper, and $981 per
ounce precious metal for about $30 billion in today's dollars in the ground,
with stellar grades. At today's prices the average metal value per ton of
these new resources is $389, with the measured and indicated portion
averaging about $460/ton. At today's commodity prices the grades are highly
profitable.

So, how much money is FNX making?

FNX had a remarkable growth in earnings for Q1 2007, an increase of 845%
over Q1 2006, or $30.2 million versus $3.2 million. And shareholder have
done remarkably well, from a 52 week low of $9.05 to a high in the past week
of $35.25, or a 289% increase if perfectly timed.

But, for investors earnings need to evaluated relative to their investment.
FNX has 84 million shares and 2.5 million options give a dilute market cap
of about $3 billion. $30 million of earnings on $3 billion of market cap is
about 1% and extrapolated for a full year is about 4%, or a P/E of about 25.
Commodity prices are strong. A P/E above 12 simply is not a good idea when commodity prices are this strong unless there is a very compelling production growth story.

Taking a closer look at the Q1 earning and commodities prices in US they
realized were:

  • Ni $21.65
  • Cu $2.67
  • Pd $395
  • Pt $1530
  • Au $771
  • Co $31.34
The prices FNX realized for their production resulted in $12.3 million in
revenue above the LME average prices for Q1. They also realized even better
revenue because of the strength of the US dollar in Q1, an exchange rate of
1.17.

Price sensitivity is $1/lb change on nickel will change earnings by $9
million or $0.11/share, a $0.25/lb change in copper will change earnings by
$1.9 million or $0.02/share and a 10% movement in exchange rate will change
earnings by $12.7 million or $0.15/share. Currently commodity gains in
price are being canceled by currency losses.

The Q1 earnings included a 40% increase in production from the Levack
property. Overall production was 2.6 million pounds of nickel, 2.3 million
pounds of copper and 5,961 ounces of precious metals. At this rate they
would produce 10.4 million pounds of nickel, 9.2 million pounds of copper
and 24,000 oz of precious metals.

The year's production is forecast to be 12.7 million pounds of nickel,
10.9 million pounds of copper and 29,500 ounces of precious metal. The full
growth of 2007 has not yet been realized. Looking to 2008, production if
forecast to be about 17.5 million pounds of nickel, 40 million pounds of
copper and 64,000 oz of precious metals.

Further growth is planned through to 2010, for 24 million pounds of nickel,
100 million pounds of copper, and 135,000 ounces of precious metals.
From my way of evaluating an investment, FNX needs to double its earnings
to get to that P/E of 12 for production earning, and it looks doable for
2008 as long as commodity prices remain as strong as they are today. The
growth profile does give protection from downside risk from softening
commodity prices.

In the financial reports is a "comprehensive income" of $11.6 million that
should not be considered towards production earnings, and may result in a
one time only boost to earnings. This is from increases in equity
valuations that they own. To put into perspective of what including it on
earnings is equivalent to, consider a mutual fund. It buys equities that
the managers think will increase in price. The value of a share of the
mutual fund is the value of all the equities divided by the number of
shares.

So, consider the simplest mutual fund, with a single share. It buys an
equity worth $100 and that equity increases to $125, the value of that
mutual fund share is now $125. If that $25 dollars of equity gain was
instead consider earnings and the mutual fund was traded on earnings at that
P/E of 25 and the mutual fund share would be $25x25 = $625.

The value of equity increases to share holders needs to be evaluated the
same way a mutual fund is evaluated for its equity holdings. To evaluate as
earning is to make perilous errors in evaluating the value of your
investment. That $11.6 million dollar equity gain is worth
$11.6/86.4 million shares, or 13c per share, hardly a deciding factor one
way or another on a $34 stock.

The last thing, it never hurts to see what the insiders are doing. Part of
their income is from options so there usually is some selling. The question
is, how much?

Robert Cudney has a relationship to Northfield Capital which has sold
373,000 shares this year and he has personally sold 94,700.

Duncan Gibson shows 50,000 shares sold, Daniel Innes shows 37,987 shares
sold, Paul Makuch shows 33,333 shares sold, Daniel Owen 10,000 shares sold,
Donald Ross 23,500 shares sold.

Overall the insider selling is large and so is the cashing in.

Read More......

Monday, April 23, 2007

The CopperCorp Disaster (GoldCorp)

"How come Goldcorp is underperforming," I read over and over.

Tear into the fundamentals and the changing business dynamics and it isn't hard to figure out. My first post on the over valuation of Goldcorp pointed out many of the reasons why Goldcorp would not perform well.

It is time to update.

Prior to the merger with Glamis most of the earnings were from copper.

The cost of production changed from -$73/oz in Q4 2005 to $160/oz in Q4 2006. That's an enormous increase of $233/oz in production costs.

The eps for Q4 2006 compared to Q4 2005 is 11c compared to 30c, a whopping 63% decline. People should be grateful that the price has held at all. In Q2 2006 Goldcorp had 50c eps. Some of that reduced earnings is from a three-fold hit on copper:

  • A 20% royalty kicking in.
  • A 20% reduction in production.
  • A 30% reduction in copper price.
There will be some recovery for the copper hit for Q1 2007 as they work out their copper production problems and copper prices recover. But, there is still a 20% royalty. To appreciate the effect of the negative leverage of copper, coupled with the reduced production and price, for Northern Orion from Q2 to Q4 eps when from 22c to 6c, a 73% decline. Gold corp has gone from 50c in Q2 2006 to 11c in Q4, a 78% decline. Part of this decline is from copper, but a big part is also from the Glamis merger.

The Glamis Effect on Earnings

The gross effect of the Glamis merger on earnings was not discussed in my previous post, only that it had been expensive.

Prior to the merger, and the restated eps, Goldcorp's eps was 89c for the first 9 months, but Glamis was only 44c. This was made much worse in that Goldcorp issues 1.69 shares for each of these dog Glamis shares. 44/1.69 gives a weighted average of only 26c eps. 284 million of these dog shares were added.

To just appreciate the affect of adding these shares consider the scenario that Goldcorp been able to continue at the same rate of performance, without the Glamis merger, you would have expected about $1.19 eps for 2007 (4/3*$.89). Using the same extrapolation for Glamis, you would have expected 35c eps for the diluted Glamis shares. If you do weighted average of the 418 million Goldcorp shares with the estimated $1.19 eps with the 284 Glamis shares that had the estimated 35c eps, the combined earning potential is 67c eps.


Never mind the copper hit, assuming all things remained the same, the Glamis merger reduced the possibility of earnings by 44% due to the vast difference in earnings at the time of the merger and the gross level of share dilution to acquire Glamis.

Goldcorp debases math

When I looked at their reporting of 2006 results, imho, how they reported the earnings should be against the law. It certainly violates every math concept I know, and I teach math. You have no idea how much I use this kind of debasing of math in the class room. I find that it get kids attention that they should appreciate math like nothing else I've ever used.

As far as I can tell what has been done is legal, but I can make an argument that earnings reports should correct for mergers and dilutions to reflect the effect on earnings of the dilution or merger. It is utterly nonsensical to add numbers together with different parameters as is done is earnings reports.

To show the point, here are is what Goldcorp has reported.


eps# of shares diluted
eps
diluted
# of shares
Q1 2006$0.27340,961,000$0.24383,180,000
Q2 2006$0.50381,274,000 $0.49386,951,000
Q3 2006$0.14418,180,000$0.14422,345,000
Q4 2006$0.11597,706,000$0.11603,429,000
Annual
2006
$0.94435,189,000$0.93441,264,000
Dec 31,
2006

703,525,000


Net earnings were $408.3 million for the full year. If you divide the net earnings by the actual number of shares December 31, 2006, you get 408.3/703.5= $0.58 eps. Goldcorp reports 62% higher eps than if you take what the company actually earned and divide it by the real number of shares.

Above I did a weighted average between what Glamis' earnings had been and Goldcorp's to get 67c eps. The $408.3 million is only Goldcorp's earnings. Glamis had earnings prior to the merger and a proper way to do weighted averaging is to add those earnings to Goldcorp's earnings and then divide by the true number of shares. That gives 67c.

If you just look at Q4, the net earnings were $65.9 million, which if you divide by the 703.5 million shares give you 9c eps, not 11c. This result is overstated by 18% because there is over a month that the 284 million dog shares from Glamis are not included in the share count.

In this example the difference between what is truth when sound mathematical principles are applied and what is reported because of simply adding numbers with grossly different parameter is beyond comprehension, grossly misleading to investors and ought to be illegal.

And to make matters worse for Goldcorp investors, as of March 8, 2007 Goldcorp has 707.7 million shares, 15.1 million stock options (average exercise price $19.16) and 8.4 million warrants (exercise price $45.75), for a fully diluted count of 731 million.

Mines are depleting assets, and as such, it isn't wise to purchase mining stocks with a P/E of over 12 unless they have a stellar growth profile. If you buy into the fiscally insane idea that a gold stock should trade at a P/E multiple of 25, at the very least, it should be calculated on true earning potential. Goldcorp's earning potential is in the 67c/share range, and using that it is currently trading at an adjusted P/E of 43.

And, using the weighted average eps of 67c, it gives a share price of $16.75.

A future post will go over more problems with the Glamis merger and tear apart an analyst's valuation report. The analyst's report has set a price of 2x the NAV, which is like me saying my home is worth 2x the assessed value. The target price based on 2x the NAV was $36. But hey, I will sell you my home for 2x the assessed value. I'll even throw in my car.

Read More......

Monday, April 09, 2007

Imperial Metals - The Right Hedge

Imperial Metals is a primarily copper mining company with other metal by-products. Like Quadra, in 2006 they hedged their copper, only Imperial hedged the right way, protecting earning and minimizing losses.

The company did have derivative losses from hedging, about $27 million for 2006, relative to production, that's about 1/5th the loss that Quadra had. In one hedge they protected themselves from copper going below $1.80, but participated in price increases to $2.60. Later they had a hedge that had protection from going below $2.90/lb, but price participation up to $3.68/lb, and another hedge had price protection for $2.50/lb and price participation to $3.06/lb. Sure the hedge cost them money, but this is the right way to hedge, keeping 75-80% of the gain. Quadra hedged at $1.60.

The change in their financial position from 2005 to 2006 is stellar, short term assets up $27 million, all assets up $78 million and none of those fiat intangible assets like "Goodwill" listed on their balance sheet. Additionally, their liabilities are down by $21 million for a total change in financial postion of $99 million. Not bad for a company with a fully diluted market cap of $433 million. Earnings per share for 2006 was $2.69, or 22% of today's earlier share price of $12.12.

Imperial currently has two sources of income, their Mount Polley mine which provided net revenue sales of $210 million for 2006 and their equity income from their share in the Huckleberry mine, which provided them with $34 million. Guidance for 2007 is 98 million lbs copper, 58,800 oz gold, 596,000 oz silver, and 210,000 lbs molybdenum. And again they have hedge for 2007, 3/4rd of their copper is hedged to between $2.97 and $3.47/lb.

The company recently purchased bcMetals for $68 million, from cash and a $40 million loan. According to Management Discussion and Analysis:

The Red Chris project has received Federal and Provincial environomental approvals for mine development. A bcMetals feasibility study on the Red Chris property indicates a 25 year mine life at 30,000 tons per day with reserves of 276 million tonnes grading 0.349% copper and 0.266 g/t gold.

Working through the numbers, 276 million tonnes of 0.349% copper is a contained resource of 2.1 billion pounds of copper, which they bought for a take-over price of about 1/3 of a penny per pound, making the gold free. That price is well under the 1c/lb of copper resource guideline of my previous post.

The production rate indicates 84 million pounds of copper/year and 94,000 oz of gold. With recovery rates taken into consideration it would be more in the range of 75 million pounds of copper and 50,000 oz gold (my rough estimate).

Other exploration holding include their Bear property which has molybdenum and copper. The best drill results were 296 meters of 0.059 molybdenum and 0.27% copper. Some pure moly plays for open pit have just 0.06 molybdenum.

Their Sterling property is gold and so far has defined a resource of 46,000 ounces of gold with 7.41 g/t. There are more exploration opportunities on this property.

Their Nak property has rich chalcopyrite veins which grab samples returned grades as high as 5.11% copper and has drill results with 0.1 to 1.1% copper.

Their Giant Copper property, located 220 km east of Vancouver, had a 1989 feasibility study that calculated a reserve of 3.7 million tonnes of 1.08% copper, 0.47 g/t gold, 19.18 g/t silver and 0.01 molybdenum. These results are before NI43-101, so they are not compliant.

Their Porcher Island property is also a gold property with before NI43-101 estimated mining reserve of 623,000 tonnes of 6.9 g/t gold.

By doing the hedge the right way Imperial Metals is in a very, very strong position for 2007 earnings. They will be able to pay off debt and be in a strong financial position to further develop and explore their properties.

Read More......

Earth for Sale

Check out the bullboards and complaints about undervaluation of a stock because of the reserve or resource abounds. I've found the metal values in the ground staggering at times myself.

So, just what is the value of the metals in say the top 1 km of the Earth's crust?
Well, copper makes up about 0.00007% of the Earth's crust, which is 40 km thick and that is about 2.6% of the mass of the Earth, and the mass of the Earth is 6 x 10^24 kilograms. Convert that to copper and you get 6 quadrillion pounds, which at today's prices is $18 quadrillion dollars. In case you'd never hear of a quadrillion, its 1000 time bigger than a trillion, so $18 quadrillion is 18,000 times bigger than a trillion. It's 2000 times bigger than the US federal debt. It's $300,000 for every man, woman and child on Earth.
So, then I looked at Uranium. It makes up about 4 parts per million of the Earth's crust, so there is about 32 quadrillion pounds. At $100 per pound it comes to $3.2 quintillion, that's 32 with 17 more zeros or about 350,000 times more than the US debt, or about $50 million for every man, woman and child.

Then there's gold, silver, zinc, lead, platinum, rhodium, palladium, cobalt, nickel, etc., all worth outrageous amounts of money at today's prices.
Truly, the only metal worth those prices is the metal being sold today that those prices.
So, how do you value that which is in the ground?
There was a small item in a paper I was reading that said the industry standard for buying a copper resource property is about a 1c per pound for the resource, and copper resource cut-off is 0.2% or roughly 4.4 lbs per ton. This means anything under 0.2% you can essentially assign zero value unless it is producing or a by-product.
In that light the valuation of a property becomes a lot different. For copper, that's about 1/300th of the value you hear on the bullboards.
Consider that mining a property requires acquisition costs; exploration costs; capital costs; production costs; operating costs; taxes, etc. The acquisition costs have the longest carrying time and can take a long time to recover the investment.
So, that's where you start and then you add or subtract depending on the answer to the following questions:
  • How good is the quality of the grade?
  • What's the likelihood that the management team will actually turn the resource in a mine?
  • What is the access to infrastructure?
  • What's the length of time to actually build a mine?
  • What will the labour costs be like?
Certainly those who are mostly likely to make real money are current producers and near term producers, and then it just makes so much more sense to value the company based on production.

Read More......

Tuesday, April 03, 2007

Quadra, An Update

As stated in previous posts, Quadra is going to have big earnings for 2007. Quadra made a hedge on the wrong side and it cost them $144 million in derivative losses.
But Quadra is moving forward. They recently entered purchase agreement for a large molydenum property with good grades of molybdenum. The graph shows the size of the Malmbjerg deposit relative to other deposits.


The tables below show the actual break down of the Malmbjerg deposit. The deposit as a whole has an average of 2.6 lbs of molydenum per ton. Using a 0.2% MoS2 cut off it averages 3.2 lbs/ton for over 300 million pounds of molybdenum.


Malmbjerg Deposit - Measured Mineral Resources
Cut-off
(% MoS2)
Tonnage
(tonnes)
Grade
(% MoS2)
Million lbs
Molybdenum
Avg # lbs
moly/ton
cut-off # lbs
moly/ton
0.28 6,900,000 0.311 28.3 4.113.70
0.26 11,700,000 0.29345.33.873.43
0.24 21,700,000 0.27378.23.603.17
0.22 30,500,000 0.261105.13.452.90
0.20 37,300,000 0.252124.13.332.64
0.15 48,800,000 0.234 150.73.091.98
0.12 52,900,000 0.226 157.82.981.58


Malmbjerg Deposit - Indicated Mineral Resources
Cut-off
(% MoS2)
Tonnage
(tonnes)
Grade
(% MoS2)
Million lbs
Molybdenum
Avg # lbs
moly/ton
cut-off # lbs
moly/ton
0.28 6,400,000 0.301 25.4 3.973.70
0.26 13,100,000 0.28549.33.763.43
0.24 23,600,000 0.26983.83.553.17
0.22 39,100,000 0.253130.63.342.90
0.20 60,600,000 0.238190.43.142.64
0.15 124,300,000 0.206 338.02.721.98
0.12 163,900,000 0.188 406.72.481.58



Malmbjerg Deposit - Measured and Indicated Mineral Resources>
Cut-off
(% MoS2)
Tonnage
(tonnes)
Grade
(% MoS2)
Million lbs
Molybdenum
Avg # lbs
moly/ton
cut-off # lbs
moly/ton
0.28 13,300,000 0.306 53.7 4.043.70
0.26 24,800,000 0.28994.63.813.43
0.24 45,300,000 0.271162.03.583.17
0.22 69,500,000 0.257235.83.392.90
0.20 97,900,000 0.243314.03.212.64
0.15 173,100,000 0.214 489.02.821.98
0.12 216,800,000 0.198 566.62.611.58


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Wednesday, March 28, 2007

The Leverage of Earnings

"Around 2000 I left my job and cashed out my pension and put it into commodities," was what a colleague was saying. "I had $14,000 and it is now a quarter of a million."

The commodities bull run created an enormous leverage of earnings. Take Northern Orion, a junior start-up company around the beginning of the bull run and now it has $230 million in the bank. The big players have reported billions of dollars of earning.

Eastern Platinum has gone from a junior start-up to a company with a $1.5 billion dollar market cap. Its earnings are a little on the low side for the market right now, but with 700% expansion of mining production over 5 year planned, high grades of platinum resources and demand for platinum as both an industrial metal and a precious metal, they will have good growth in earning..

Roca is a new start-up that if moly prices remain where they are should make in the range of 25-30c/share in either Q3 or Q4 this year.

Blue Note is also building a new mine and should have earnings of 2-4c by Q3 or Q4 this year. Blue Note will perform nicely this year.

Aur Resources has gone from a $2 stock in 2000 to $23 today with 2006 earnings of $3.23 per share, and 60-70% growth in production planned over the next 2 or so years.

To have been there at the beginning of the bull run, at the period when earnings exploded.

There is one stock I've recently looked at that an unfortunate hedge decision reduced its earnings to about 20-25% of what they would have had without the hedge. The company's earnings were 87c/share for 2006, and with only 40 million shares, taking a $144 million dollar loss and still making money is amazing. $144 million is about $3.60/share of cash flow that they didn't have to put to earnings. There is a thing called taxes that they would have to pay on that, so it isn't quite that good, but it is very sweet overall.

The stock is Quadra and this stock is in a position to see a leverage of earnings much like the early bull run days, indeed, 2007 will be Quadra's bull run.

Quadra's hedge which limited them to an average of $1.72/lb of copper for 2006 hit them at both end, earnings and costs. There is a thing called "price participation" where as the price of a commodity increases, smelter companies get a cut of that increasing price. Quadra had hedged at $1.60 and copper went as high as $3.99/lb on the LME. So, not only did Quadra forfeit 60% of the potential income, they had to pay smelter costs as if they were getting $3.99/lb. So Quadra paid the full costs of the bull run, but had none of the benefits. The average LME price for copper for 2006 was $3.05/lb. Quadra didn't get an average of $1.32/lb of "free" money.

Quadra has even more leverage of earning to come. They ran into a few problems with production and produced 117 million pounds of copper. They believe they've worked out those issues, certainly towards the end of Q4 their recovery rates improved considerably, and they've given guidance of $125 million pounds, an small increase of 7%. But, they are in the process of building a second mine which is planned to start producing late 2008 and will add 75 million pounds of production per year, so a two year growth in production rate of 67%. There are a couple downsides, increased debt to pay for building the new mine, but that is highly preferable over dilution that would limit earning potential forever.

2007 is going to be Quadra's year for stellar performance.

QUA Toronto, QADMF.PK in the US.

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Wednesday, March 21, 2007

Quadra - When the hedge is over

Quadra is a $350 million, fully diluted, market cap mining company with a producing mine with 2007 production guidance:

  • 125 million pounds of copper,
  • 60,000 ounces of gold,
  • no guidance on molybdenum, 260,000 lb in 2006.
They have just obtained financing to build a second mine for start-up in 2008, guidance 28 million pounds, increasing to 75 million pounds in 2009, bringing the fully diluted number of shares up to 42.7 million. Additionally they have plans to develop a third mine in Chile which will produce 300 million pounds.


    Last year copper prices peaked at $3.99/lb and they have come down, slaughtering the earnings for most copper mines. Take Goldcorp, market cap 19.7 billion, earnings crumbled to 11c/share in Q2 from 50c/share in Q4 -- in Q2 Goldcorp's copper earnings accounted for 65% of their total earnings, and enabled them to claim -$123/oz production costs on gold, all from a mere 46,700 lbs of copper sales.

    For 2006 Quadra's eps was a mere $0.87, indeed, while Goldcorp was producing its record earnings, Quadra was losing money. Quadra made a hedge, and the hedge ended up costing Quadra $143.9 million in derivative expenses. The average LME price for copper in 2006 was $3.05, but Quadra's average price was $1.32/lb less, $1.73/lb, because of the hedge. $143.9 million in lost income amounts to $3.53/share. After taxes it means that $2.18/share of earning potential was lost to a bad hedge. Without the bad hedge, eps for 2006 would have been in the $3+/share range.

    Quadra has shipped the last of its hedged copper and will clear the last of its hedge loss this quarter.

    Think of the end of the hedge as an enormous cut to costs. Their income for 2006 was $393 million, and out of that came this enormous $144 million hedge cost, or 37% of their revenue.

    Another problem that Quadra had was lower than expected recovery rates, a mere 61% on copper until the last two weeks of December, where it increased back to the 70-80% recovery rate. This problem appears to have resolved now, but it also lowered overall production for 2006.

    So, Quadra is going into 2007 with a double leverage potential on earnings, an enormous reduction in expenses, and improved production rates. At $3/lb for copper, $375 million, at $650 for gold, $39 million, and perhap $5 million for their molybdenum, for 2007 revenue of about $419 million, and no $144 million hedge expense.

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Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Blue Note (BN on Venture)

Blue Note is a little known near term producer. It is building a new mill to commence operations in June and will start mining the ore for the mill in April. The metals are zinc, lead, copper and silver.

Blue Note will be a commodity winner due to their choice to develop their mine and cash in on the commodity prices rather than to drill, and drill, and drill their property. An educated look at the property told them they have these metals at depth. An existing mine in the area has been mining for over 20 years and has mined to incredible depth. The geology of the area is similar.


A difference between Canadian and Australian philosophy in mining is that Canadian companies and investors have become more concerned with showing the resource is there rather than making money. Australian companies look at this policy of premature drilling when you have good reason to believed the resource is there as wasteful of capital. Spend $10 million today to establish a resource you won't use for another 20 years means you have spent $10 million that will gain no return for 20 years. Their mines work on a philosophy of having about 5 years of reserves always established. It maximizes the use of capital.

Blue Note has followed this type of philosophy in choosing to put the resource to work by building a mine and earning money sooner rather than later and also tying up capital to establish a reserve that won't be used for 20 years.

Their forecasted 2007 cash flow numbers look very good. At prices of $1.44 for zinc, $0.52 for lead, $2.80 for copper, and $12.50 for silver they expect $15.3 million cash flow. They also expect costs net of byproduct credits to be $0.76. Currently the price on lead means this cash flow estimate is low by about $10-$12 million. They are most price sensitive to zinc, then lead, then silver. Copper has little influence on their cash flow as it will only contribute perhaps 2% of the total.

The number get impressive for 2008. They have adjusted their prices way down, $1.17 for Zinc, $0.44 for lead, $2.29 for copper, and $11.65 for silver. The costs also decline, to $0.55 net of by product credit, and it gives them about $58 million in pre-tax cash flow. After taxes I calculate 2008 eps of about $0.14, exceptionally impressive for stock currently trading at $0.47-$0.48, and those earnings strongly take into consideration the price of commodities coming down. The IRR on the mine is 126.3%.

As a near term producer, Blue Note is one that will win big time for its investors.

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Friday, January 05, 2007

How I Discovered the Gold Bubble

I have been investing in the stock market and one of my investment "finds" started to have a sell-off when I thought it was undervalued. I needed to be sure that I had properly assessed my stock of interest, so I started on a journey of comparing two stocks for market valuation.

The stock that interested me is Northern Orion. The stock that I decided to compare it to was Goldcorp. I chose Goldcorp because Northern Orion owns 1/8th of the Alumbrera mine and Goldcorp owns 3/8th. It seemed that they should have similar valuation based on this one interest.

What I discovered was that Northern Orion was trading for about 10c on the dollar compared to Goldcorp. I still strongly believe that Northern Orion is undervalued, I never expected to find a gold bubble in mature gold stocks, one that in my mind is as serious as the tech bubble.

Read my analysis and decide for yourself. Aside from the copper concern, the majority of these concerns apply to mature gold stocks and will make them under perform beyond anyone's expectations.

The over valuation of Goldcorp


Goldcorp is a company with 702 million shares that took over Glamis in late 2006. Currently a check on any stock website is still not showing the 280 million extra shares from that takeover and is enormously understating market cap. At a share price of about $28.50, Goldcorp has a market Cap of $20 billion.

To understand why Goldcorp is overvalued, these things need to be examined and evaluated:

  1. The leverage of earnings of both copper and gold.
  2. The price elasticity of gold bullion to gold stocks, ie, market cap.
  3. The increasing cost of acquisitions.
  4. The roll of the life of a mine - increasing rates of depletion.
  5. The roll of lower quality gold properties.
  6. The roll of depreciating mines.
  7. The level of reserves to market cap.
Major Concern #1 - negative leverage of copper

When I looked at Goldcorp, it was prior to the Glamis merger. At that time I found from reading the financials that in Q2/06 64% of earnings came from one mine for Goldcorp, the Alumbrera mine, and for the first 9 months of 2006 60% of earnings came from Alumbrera. Alumbrera is copper, not gold. I'm not entirely sure for Goldcorp, but for Northern Orion in Q2/06 they got $4.44/lb average. When 60% of earning come from one mine, where the price of the commodity is going down, that is huge in terms of loss of income for the business.

Before the merger, there were 60% of the number of shares that there are now. This means that for the year, it can be expected that about 1/3rd of earnings for the entire company will have come from copper.

If you look at the average price of $1.01 prior to the bull on copper, copper increased to roughly 440% of its previous price. I truly believe this leverage effect of earnings on Goldcorp has been grossly under appreciated in terms of how Goldcorp can never again have the stellar performance of the past.

Alumbrera has a twofold effect on earnings for Goldcorp. First, for 2005, the earnings were not subject to the 20% royalty, so earn estimates for Goldcorp for Alumbrera for 2005 based on those copper prices will be less. The upside is that 2006 only saw gross earnings without that royalty payment for Q1, so 2006 earnings are not completely plumped up by an unrealized 20% decline in copper prices due to the royalty kicking in.

The second effect is that copper prices are going down and copper LME stocks are going up. Traditionally demand for copper is lower this time of year, so even though copper stocks are going up, that may turn around this quarter, but copper stocks are increasing rapidly. The other thing about copper, every producer that can has increased their existing output as best they can. This has in the shorter term increased supply, but in the longer term shortens mine life.

I have not done the required homework, so I really don't know how much of the new production is new mines, and how much is increased output of existing mines. But, my overall sense from my reading is that producers have gone for the fastest path to increasing production, which was to eliminate inefficiencies in current operations, Alumbrera is not exception, production has been increase by 10%.

The other thing that may have happened as well is that mines have not kept up on maintenance the requires reduction in output. As copper prices decline, those scheduled maintenance needs will happen, so in some respects, In the short term there may be an unsustainable increase in production. If I'm wrong, copper prices will decline further this year and will probably settle in the $2.25 range. I do not see copper averaging at $3.40 as predicted in the BMO analyst report, but possibly in the $3 range, but the recent decline in copper price and increases in stock make that an unlikely prospect.

The effect of the decline in copper prices is enormous for Goldcorp, as such a high percentage of its earnings were from copper. With 168 million pounds of copper, every dollar decline in copper requires gold to go up $54 at current production rates just to offset it. So, from the high of $4.44 to today's low of $2.51, based on a production of 2.8 million ounces, gold has to go up $92/oz for Goldcorp's earning to remain constant. I have taken into consideration that 20% royalty in this calculation.

Major, Major, Major Concern #2 - reduced leverage of Gold.

This concern is more a concept than actual numbers, but this concept will play out in earnings. It mathematically has to. I believe that the concept of leverage of earnings is being utterly ignored in analysts and brokers alike, and not recognized in terms of its ability to never again give repeatable results regardless of what the price of gold does now.

The simplest and most dramatic way to demonstrate this concern is to do a mathematical analysis using ratios. I teach ratios to kids in grade 8.

Say you have a producer who when gold was $300/oz managed to make $10/oz profits and the earnings/share worked out to 4%. Say the share costs $1. Now say gold is $600/oz. So now profit is $310 and a simple ratio gives earnings (310/10)x4 = 124%. This kind of leverage of earnings made gold such a stellar performer up to now in the market, but mathematically, it can never be repeated. The leverage ratio here is 31, utterly enormous. Share price would then adjust, go up 31 times, to $31 and the return would again be 4%.

What has happened is share prices have adjusted to market cap and shares have gone way up, so earnings are again 4%. Market cap has also gone up 31 times. If it was 1 billion, now it is 31 billion. Keep everything else constant, costs are still $290 for the sake of this analysis of the reduced effects of leverage.

So, now say gold goes up another $300, to $900. Now profit is $610. The leverage effect is now (610/310)x4 = 7.9%. The leverage effect now is 1.97. The reduced leverage effect of increasing prices is 31/1.97 is 15.8. This is a decimal number. I also teach percents to kids in grade 8. This is a reduction of leverage of 1580%, providing costs remain constant.

Leverage of earnings early in the bull run played a dramatic effect on the increase in earnings on gold shares from increases in gold prices in a way that I believe is *unrecognized and unrepeatable*.

This incredible leverage of earning early in the bull run, in my assessment, is probably responsible for erroneously justifying P/E of 25 to 50 are acceptable for gold stocks because profit grow rapidly with increasing gold prices. The stellar leverage is a one time only deal. It declines further with every dollar increase in the price of gold.

Major Concern - Price Elasticity of Bullion versus Market Cap Concern


This is a simple mathematical analysis that I've talked about with high school students in the classroom in terms of what I see happening with gold stocks in general.

Take gold at say a price of $625/oz. Say you buy an ounce and the gold price goes up to $725, or by $100. Your investment has increased by 16% and you own the gold bullion.

For simplicity, say the market cap of Goldcorp is $20 billion (it was very close to that). Their production forecast is 2.8 million ounces of gold, which at @ a $100 increase in the price of gold would bring in an additional $280 million. So, the absolute value of how much earnings could go up relative to market cap is 280/20000*100% = 1.4%. So, if earnings were 4% they could go up to 5.4% if gold went up $100, but taxes also have to be paid.

The price elasticity of the raw numbers of what you actually have is the bullion is 11 time better to own right now than the gold stock, if you believe that gold is going to go up in value.

What is really remarkable here, is that not only is the level of earnings pathetic with the stock in comparison to bullion, you not longer own the gold, or essentially you have a very negative return. The gold has been sold.

Major concern - Increasing cost of Acquisitions

The cost of replacement properties has increased dramatically. I've pasted a recent report at the end. At the beginning of the bull run reserves cost about $33 oz. The Glamis take-over cost $175/oz. This is around $140/oz increase in acquisition costs.

The exact numbers don't matter, for simplicity, there is about $140/oz increase in gold replacement costs. Previous analysis was just looking at all things constant. All things aren't constant, and in fact work against profitability. Costs are increasing. Gold needs to go up to about $750/oz just to maintain earnings in terms of what those replacement cost are.

For Goldcorp, $140/oz in increased costs translated to 2% less to earnings per share.

Major concern - The life of a mine - increasing rates of depletion

Some of the spins I've read on the life of mine gives that a short mine life is a good thing because mines stop producing and it gives constant demand.

My spin on it is very different.

Red deer, a Goldcorp's second largest contibutor to earnings, has a mine life left of 12 years. Alumbrera has a mine life left of 10 years. Prior to the merger, those two mines were making 80% of Goldcorp's earnings. There are 23 properties listed. It means that one, and sometimes two mines need to be built every year just to keep up, never mind growth. Replacement is enormous...

In the shorter term for Goldcorp you see production going from 2.8 million ounces to 3.5 million ounces. From that point on you see a rapid decline in output due to the end of the life of the mines, with 60% of the 3.5 million ounces in mines that come to the end of their life within 12 years.

The rate of depletion of Goldcorp gold reserves without replacement looks something like this:
2005 - 40.5 million ounces
2006 - 38.5 million ounces, 2 million mined, depletion, 5%
2007 - 35.7 million ounces, 2.8 million mined, depletion, 7.3%
2008 - 32.6 million ounces, 3.1 million mined, depletion 8.6%
2009 - 29.3 million ounces, 3.3 million mined, depletion 10.1%
2010 - 25.9 million ounces, 3.4 million mined, depletion 11.6%
2011 - 22.4 million ounces, 3.5 million mined, depletion 13.5%
2012 - 18.9 million ounces, 3.5 million mined, depletion 15.6%

This means that Goldcorp is in a squeeze position of having to constantly be acquiring new properties to keep this monster machine going. It puts Goldcorp at major risk for increasing costs, and indeed, the costs never stop because of the constant need for recapitalization.

Major concern - depreciating mines

Mines are depreciating assets. The average life of a gold mine is 14 years.

To my way of thinking in terms of valuation, that means that earnings need to be 7% to make up for the average depletion rate plus inflation plus whatever it is you expect for the risk you take. Strictly my opinion here, but without strong other mathematical reasons and evaluation, a P/E of 10 is the minimum as to where you start, and then make adjustments up or down based on the fundamentals of the gold stocks. How much is being added to reserves and how much is being mined. If new reserves are being added at the same rate as the depletion, a P/E of 12-15 may be justified.

Another way of looking at it for Goldcorp based on the 41 million ounces of reserves and 3.5 million ounces of production fore casted in the future, well, that means that in 41/3.5 = 12, so in 12 years all you own is empty holes, with the gold all mined and sold.

12 years of earnings at 3%, if Goldcorp can even manage that, gives earning returned over the life its reserves that is only 36% of market cap. With a P/E of 12 you'd get 100% of market cap returned, with no time cost of the investment. With an estimate of 2006 earnings at $1.03, a P/E of 12 would give a share price of $12.38.

Goldcorp has a higher rate of depletion than average, so imho, even a P/E of 8 for it is generous.

Major concern - Lower quality properties available for replacement.
Again, from the source below, there has been a drastic reduction in property finds with more than 2.5 million ounces. With production rates fore casted to be going up to 3.5 million ounces, there needs to be 1-2 of these properties per year found and purchased just as a replacement activity. The low supply should further increase costs of acquiring these properties.

Lower quality properties generally means higher mining costs.

Major concern - value of reserves to market cap

Goldcorp's web site reports for 2005 the following reserves:

40.5 million oz gold @$425 = $17 billion
687 million oz silver @$10 = $6.9 billion
1.5 billion lb copper @$1.35 = $2 billion
3.7 billion lb lead @$0.50 = $1.9 billion
8 billion lb zinc @$1.25 = $10 billion
Total: $38 billion

It isn't corrected for the 2 million ounces of gold production for 2006, but that can slide...

And there are properties that haven't been properly assessed. There may be 10 million ounces in those properties, or there may be 100 million ounces. The properties have not be assessed.

However, what they can show gives a mere 2.2 times the market cap (using $17 billion market cap).

It seems prudent that market cap to what they can show at bearish prices should be at least 5 times the known reserves. This valuation alone puts Goldcorp's share price at $10.80.

Summary of concerns about Goldcorp
  • Negative leverage of copper - gold must go up $90 to cover.
  • Declining leverage of gold - leveraged increases in earning can never match early performance -- it is mathematically impossible.
  • Price elasticity of the bullion is 11x that of the stock.
  • Increasing cost of acquisitions means that gold must go up $140 just to cover.
  • Depreciation of mines is higher in the gold industry than any other mining industry.
  • Quality of replacement properties is declining, meaning costs will increase.
  • Availability of replacement properties is declining meaning acquisition costs can further be expected to increase.
  • The ratio of reserves to market cap for Goldcorp is disgraceful.

At the end of my analysis of Goldcorp I was truly horrified that anyone would be recommending this stock. Certainly if any of my analysis has merit, many reputations will be seriously hurt. But personally, I wouldn't buy Goldcorp at $10. I simply don't see growth potential at that price.

My Conclusions:
  • Gold prices must increase $230/oz to maintain earnings for Goldcorp.
  • Assets are depleting at a much higher rate than earnings.
  • Goldcorp is trading at about 3 times its value.
  • All Gold companies are facing increasing costs, reduced leverage, and greater difficulty for finding replacement properties.
(stocks with higher costs to at the start of the bull run have not increased to the degree that low cost producers increased, they simply never had the same leverage of earning to pump up their stock prices.)

The Under Valuation of Northern Orion

I stated that I saw Northern Orion has being grossly undervalue. All of its earning come from copper, so it too should expect much lower earning from its existing operations. My interest in Northern Orion came not from it current earnings, but it massive reserves and massive growth prospects, comparable to the potential of Goldcorp 6-7 years ago. Northern Orion has massive increase in earning opportunity even in a declining-copper price market.

Points that favor Northern Orion
  1. Market cap to reserves is enormous.
  2. Strong cash position.
  3. Expected cash from warrants can provide some capital costs.
  4. Good cash flow from Alumbrera.
  5. Aqua Rica property is well studied and Northern Orion has applied for building permits.
  6. Production increase is forecast to increase by 660% when the new mine starts.
  7. Low cost producer because of net credits of gold and molybdenum.
  8. Lower depletion rates.
Reserves to Market Cap for Northern Orion

Northern Orion has two properties, its 1/8th interest in the Alumbrera mine and Agua Rica.

The Alumbrera mine has 10 years of life left, Northern Orion's share is 50 million pounds per year of copper and 75,000 ounces of gold, exactly 1/3 of what Goldcorp gets from this mine.

Simple extrapolation, total reserve of this property is 1/2 billion pounds of copper and 750,000 ounces of gold, which at $1.35 for copper and $400 for gold is $0.675 billion for copper and $0.300 billion for gold, or about $1 billion.

The Agua Rica property is Northern Orion's hidden gem.

The feasibility study gives this total as to what can be mined over a 23 year period. This is more conservative than just looking at the reserve because recovery rates are taken into account. There are 6 million ounces of gold in the reserve, but only 3 million ounces are considered recoverable as about 50% of the reserve is not recoverable in the mining process. There are 13 million ounces in the resource. There are 21.4 billion pounds in the resource for copper and 1.7 billion pounds for molybdenum.

The recoverable metal estimates for Agua are
7.6 billion pounds of copper @1.35 = $10.3 billion
3 million ounces of gold @400 = $1.2 billion
360 million pounds of molybdenum. @12 = $4.3 billion

The two properties combine give $17 billion at $1.35 for copper, $12 for molybdenum and $400 for gold.

Diluted, Northern Orion has 221.5 million shares. At $3.70/share that gives a diluted market cap of $820 million ($560 million undiluted).

So, at bearish prices reserves to market is 21 times. A valuation of 1/10th production forecasts at bearish prices gives a valuation of $7.40.

Strong Cash Position and Warrants

Northern Orion has $180 million in cash in the bank. Should the fully diluted market cap be realized, it will have an extra $160 million from warrants. That's $340 million dollars, leaving only $400 million of market cap for valuation of the rest of the assets.

If you take the bearish value of what's in the ground, $17 billion and compare it to the rest of the market cap, well, that's 42 times the market cap less cash position.

Strong cash flow from Alumbrera

For 2005, with average copper prices at $2.37 equity earning were $46,755,000, and cash flow was $75,500,000. Earning per share at this price was $0.31. This is in the "ball park" of where copper prices can be expected and cash flow for the size of the company is strong.

Over the three years to bring the new mine to production, it is reasonable to expect another $150 million to retained earnings which can be used towards the construction costs of the new mine. Quarter 2/06 had cash flow of around $56 million alone. This drastically reduced estimate takes into account strong declines in copper prices, but is still strong cash flow.


Aqua Rica is ready for building.

The Aqua Rica property has an strong investment in drilling and feasibility studies and is at the point that permits have been applied for to build the new mine. The down side is that it is expected to take 8-10 months to get the permits approved.

Production growth is enormous compared to current operations.

The new production is expected to be:
  • 368 million pounds of copper
  • 120,000 oz gold
  • 15.4 million pounds of molybdenum.
The increase of cash flow at prices of $2 for copper, $425 for gold and $12 for molybdenum is $736 million for copper, $51 million for gold, and $185 million for molybdenum, for a total of $970 million dollars.

At a price of $2.37 for copper Alumbrera earned $0.31/share. A simple ratio extrapolation for a $2 price with a 660% increase in production gives (2/2.37) x (7.70) x 0.31 = 6.5 x 0.31 = $2/share earnings. This doesn't take into account there would also be molybdenum, which is like a bonus production. 185/221.5 = $0.84, so earnings should go to somewhere between $2-3/share.

The cash flow situation is that Northern Orion will have in the range of a half billion to pay for the new mine and will need to finance $1.5 billion. Their assets and cash flow are strong enough to do this without further dilution.

The new mine production is going to generate a cash flow in the range of what Alumbrera generates, only this will be 100% Northern Orion owned. To put this into perspective, Northern Orion's cash flow can be expected to be in the range of 40-50% of Goldcorp's 2007 cash flow, yet it has a market valuation 1/20th of that of Goldcorp. ($820m vs $17 billion) Further, the difference in the mine life (23 years) and availability of replacement reserves means that Northern Orion would not be subjected to they same types of increasing costs.

Low cost producer due to gold and molybdenum cash credits, lower depletion rates

Aqua Rica's cash costs for production would make it one of the lowest cost producers. This is the type of circumstance that led to the stellar growth and returns for Goldcorp, with a difference, depletion rates are lower. After the new mine is built, the shorter term, depletion rates are very high and cash flow is higher. Total production for 2012-2016 for copper would be 418 million pounds. It declines to 368 million pounds in 2017 when Alumbrera has come to the end of its life, and in 2022 the highest streams of copper are expected to be mined and production further declines to 300 million pounds for another 13 years.

The rate of depletion of Northern Orion's copper reserves looks something like this:
2006 - 8.1 billion pounds
2007 - 8.05 billion pounds, 50 million mined, depletion, 0.6%
2008 - 8 billion pounds, 50 million mined, depletion 0.6%
2009 - 7.95 billion pounds, 50 million mined, depletion 0.6%
2010 - 7.7 billion pounds, 250 million mined, depletion 3.1%
2011 - 7.28 billion pounds, 420 million mined, depletion 5.5%
2012 - 6.86 billion pounds, 420 million mined, depletion 5.8%

The cash flow is such that capital cost can be paid back while there is the higher production from the new mine as well as the continued cash flow from Alumbrera.

With longer mine life, Northern Orion is never in the type of squeeze position that mature gold stocks are in. Over the long term, they are not subjected to the same squeeze to keep production going to ensure maintenance of earnings, never mind to increase them.

Summary of under valuation of Northern Orion

  • The value of what's expected to be sold at half of today's market prices is $17 billion, 22 times the diluted market cap, and using a value of market cap being 10 times bearish price estimates give a today value for Northern Orion of $7.40.
  • Earnings per share can be expected to increase to about $2/share even if copper is $2/lb. With a target P/E of 10, once production is in full swing, target price can be $20/share. With a target P/E of 8, target price can be $16.00.
  • Northern Orion has a strong cash position, 35% of it undiluted market cap in cash, and 46% of its diluted market cap taking into account the cash from warrants.

My Conclusion: Northern Orion is grossly undervalued. It is a strong buy to $7 based of property holdings alone.

Everywhere I look, I think I've been conservative towards Northern Orion, and actually generous towards Goldcorp. For example, I've stated 10 times bearish prices for Northern Orion, using bearish prices, whereas for for Goldcorp I've suggested it should have 5 times the reserves at bearish prices relative to market cap. The estimate for Northern Orion puts copper at $1.35, highly, highly bearish. The estimate for Goldcorp uses reserve, for Northern Orion the estimate is corrected for the non-recoverable percentage in the mining process.

Copper prices have declined faster than expected, but there is a new mine entry barrier price. Northern Orion's entry price is much lower than average due to low production costs, and the enormous reserve was acquired at very low costs.

The recent Phelps Dodge merger puts an in the ground valuation for copper at $0.70. Their average production costs are $0.50/pound. With Northern's Orion's net of metal credits production costs at -$0.02, it is simply far more competitive.
Another tiny cap stock, Equinox, shows production costs of $0.70/lb.

Starting at a copper price of about $2.25 high cost producers start to have problems raising capital costs, and it increase from there. The sell off of Northern Orion indicates how true that is in terms of being able to attract capital for investment as copper prices decline. Copper was able to stay at around $1/lb for so long because land and capital costs had long been paid for, and the long life of mines enabled them to simply continue as ongoing concerns, without capital for replacement or new investment. And, at those prices, mines were going bankrupt.



Gold Takeovers Reach Record on Lack of New Supplies

By Choy Leng Yeong
Dec. 27 (Bloomberg) -- Gold-company acquisitions this year surged to the highest level in at least a decade, and the industry may continue its buying spree in 2007 as producers struggle to find new deposits.
Goldcorp Inc.'s $8.5 billion acquisition of Glamis Gold Ltd. was the biggest of 357 deals valued at a total of $24.3 billion this year, data compiled by Bloomberg shows. That eclipsed the $16.2 billion spent last year on 341 transactions, including Barrick Gold Corp.'s $10 billion purchase of Placer Dome Inc.
Producers are rushing to boost supply because mines are being depleted faster than new reserves are being found, and a six-year rally in gold prices is providing cash to buy assets. The number of discoveries of at least 2.5 million ounces has declined for eight straight years, according to Metals Economics Group in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
``The driving force behind the M&A is that you have difficulty finding new gold mines,'' said Graham Birch, who helps manage $27 billion at BlackRock Investment Management in London. ``It's all about trying to get access to reserves.''
From 1992 to 2005, the world produced 1.1 billion ounces of gold, or 1.8 times more than the new resources discovered among deposits of at least 2.5 million ounces, Metals Economics Group said.
The drop in new reserves followed years of reduced spending on exploration as gold fell to a 20-year low of $253.20 an ounce in 1999. Worldwide exploration budgets fell to a 12-year low of about $780 million in 2002, said Jason Goulden, director of corporate exploration strategy at Metals Economics.
`Scramble for Land'
``There is a scramble for land,'' said Ian Cockerill, chief executive officer of Johannesburg-based Gold Fields Ltd. ``From about 1996 until about a couple of years ago, there was a marked decline in the amount of exploration dollars. The industry is staring down the barrel of the gun that says, `Where are the replacement ounces coming from?'''
Gold Fields, the fourth-largest producer, earlier this month completed a $1.53 billion purchase from Barrick of half of the world's biggest deposit, the South Deep mine in South Africa. Gold Fields is buying shares in Western Areas Ltd., which owns the rest of South Deep. The deal will increase the company's reserves by about half.
The price of gold has more than doubled to $630.30 an ounce today from a 20-year low in 1999. The precious metal reached a 26- year high of $732 on May 12. The rally, fueled by investors seeking a hedge against inflation or an alternative to the dollar as it fell against the euro, has spurred demand for new reserves.
Cost of Reserves
The cost of reserves rose to a record $120 an ounce in 2005, compared with a low of $33 in 2000, said James Lowrey, a senior analyst at Metals Economics, which tracks more than 1,450 companies and deals of at least $50 million since 1995.
Gold Fields CEO Cockerill admits he paid top dollar for the South Deep mine at $104 an ounce. ``It is certainly one of the more expensive acquisitions that we have made'' compared with the company's historical average of $60, he said. ``But then again, it's a very special ore body.''
The mine, west of Johannesburg, contains as much as 29.3 million ounces, equal to about a third of the world's annual gold production. Gold Fields plans to study the viability of expanding annual production to 1 million ounces, from the 800,000 ounces expected yearly by 2011.
Vancouver-based Goldcorp spent about $175 for each ounce of reserves it acquired in the Glamis deal last month, and Toronto- based Iamgold Corp.'s $1.1 billion stock acquisition of Cambior Inc. valued each ounce at about $117, Lowrey of Metals Economics estimated.
Doing Deals
Doubling resources is a ``big rationale for doing this deal,'' said Goldcorp Chairman Ian Telfer, who has made more than eight acquisitions in the past four years. The purchase of Glamis helped Goldcorp overtake Johannesburg-based AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. as the world's third-largest gold producer by market value.
Citigroup Inc. was the top investment bank with five deals worth $11.6 billion, accounting for 48 percent of the market share. It advised Glamis on its takeover by Goldcorp. JP Morgan ranked second with $11.4 billion and seven deals, including Glamis.
Global gold production in the nine months ended September fell 2.2 percent to 1,804 metric tons from a year earlier, London- based researcher GFMS Ltd. estimated. The lack of new supply will help boost gold prices by $200 over the next two years, topping $800 an ounce, Telfer said.
``There is definitely a sense that the industry -- which is really good for gold -- is kind of flat to shrinking,'' said Barrick Chief Executive Officer Gregory Wilkins. ``Placer was important for positioning the company for dealing with the industry challenges.''
Gold-Company Shares
Shares of Toronto-based Barrick, which completed its acquisition of Placer Dome in March, rose 6 percent this year. Denver-based Newmont Mining Corp., whose bullion sales may plunge 14 percent this year, has fallen 15 percent, the biggest drop among the 16 companies in the Philadelphia Stock Exchange Gold and Silver Index.
Newmont, which spent $225 million to boost its stake in a mining project in western Australia this year, cut its 2006 sales forecast three times, most recently in September, because of lower output in Ghana and Uzbekistan. The company said Sept. 27 that its gold sales may fall 14 percent this year to 5.6 million ounces from 6.5 million in 2005.
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., owner of the world's biggest gold mine, last month agreed to buy copper producer Phelps Dodge Corp. for $25.4 billion. Kinross Gold Corp., Canada's third- biggest gold producer, agreed to purchase rival Bema Gold Corp. for $2.84 billion in stock to expand in Russia.
Barrick's Wilkins said his acquisition strategy won't be affected by short-term changes in prices, which have fallen 14 percent from the 26-year high reached in May.
More Bids
Barrick may make a bid for New Orleans-based Freeport to boost reserves and lower operating costs, CIBC World Markets Inc. said in a research note on Dec. 15. Both companies have declined to comment. Barrick on Dec. 7 failed in its $1.71 billion hostile bid for Vancouver-based NovaGold Resources Inc.
Kinross Chief Executive Officer Tye Burt said takeovers may get a boost from the recent slump in prices.
The decline may bring ``more targets into a price zone'' to encourage acquirers, Burt said. ``In a strong commodity price environment, it's always tough to reach price agreements. Everyone's trying to protect their production profiles.''

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